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Abstract: As technology systems have become more complex, so it is increasingly difficult for human operators to 
comprehend how the system is behaving. There is a need to better understand the causes of human-error in the context of 
the situational variables. The specific case under examination is the process of landing an aircraft. This paper applies a 
production engineering perspective. By production-process, we refer to the set of actions that are necessary to move a 
system from one state to a desired new state. Such processes involve mechanisms for taking inputs and converting them to 
the desired outputs, under certain controls and constraints. Human error is thus treated as a constraint on the processes. A 
novel process methodology is developed to represent how technical systems, situational variables, external factors, and 
human error evolve over time in a process. The applicability is demonstrated with a dataset of case studies. In parallel, a 
new categorization of human errors is derived for this situation. The method permits cases to be examined individually, 
and also collectively for patterns. The results show that the initial landing approach is often the point of error initiation. 
For the specific case of landing accidents the methodology identifies that the failure causality was the lack of attention to 
establish procedure at the very start of descent, followed by persistent disregard of disconfirmatory evidence at the initial 
landing approach, especially under conditions of poor visibility. The paper makes a methodological contribution as well 
as suggesting new insights for how human error occurs at landing. 
Keywords: Aircraft pilot, production process, safety, sociotechnical interaction, systems engineering. 
HIGHLIGHTS 
• A production engineering perspective is applied to 
aviation. 
• Methodology represents evolution of sociotechnical 
errors. 
• Application to small dataset of cases for landing 
accidents. 
• Pilots show persistent disregard of disconfirmatory 
evidence. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Complex technical systems can fail due to failure of a 
technology component, or operator error, or can be driven to 
failure by organisational factors. Mechanisms to anticipate 
the technology failure are the best developed. However, 
anticipating the contribution of human error to the overall 
reliability of a given technical system is not straightforward, 
since it can be difficult to trace the sequence of causality 
from human error through system failure. Consequently 
prophylactic risk assessment has significant limitations in the 
area of human reliability analysis and organisational factors. 
 Furthermore, there is an agent perspective to consider in 
that Human operators are functionally embedded within  
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technical systems as operators and supervisory decision-makers. 
They are agents in that they have a causal contribution to the 
state taken by the technical system. Moreover they have to 
make their decisions under time pressure, and also dynamically 
since the system changes state. Unexpected emergency 
responses may be required from human operators, and such 
situations are cognitively demanding and of greater risk of error. 
As technology systems have become more complex, so it has 
become increasingly difficult for human operators to 
comprehend how the system is behaving. There can be many 
reasons for this: large volumes of data presented by the system 
can overwhelm the operator; the system may be sufficiently 
complex that the operator only has a partial mental model of its 
operation; the system may change its mechanics as it degrades 
and the supervisory control system may not detect the change. 
A further problem is the difficulty of adequately explaining how 
human error is determined by the group dynamics, 
organisational culture, psychology factors, and individual 
cognition. 
 This paper applies a production perspective to human 
error, whereby failure is conceptualised as a process that 
fails to achieve its intended outcome. We demonstrate this 
method by application to a small set of cases for flight 
accidents, with a particular focus on the landing phase. 
2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
2.1. Risk Assessment Principles 
 The process of risk analysis has been well established, 
and even specified in standards [1]. The process is generally 
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perceived to be a progression of sequential tasks, for 
example ISO31000 and AS/NZS 4360 describe a process 
where the main activities are to ‘establish the context’, 
‘identify risks’, ‘analyse risks’, evaluate risks’, and ‘treat 
risks’. Collateral activities include ‘communicate and 
consult’ and ‘monitor and review’, which are further 
elaborated with text descriptions [2, 3]. The method is able 
to accommodate human error and risks other than 
technological error. However, it is important to note that 
these risk management methodologies limit themselves 
primarily to the prophylactic component, and only weakly if 
at all address the other components such as diagnosis and 
emergency response. 
2.2. Human-Error Generally 
 The primary mechanism to include the dimension of 
human error into failure analysis is human reliability analysis 
(HRA), as opposed to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 
which focuses on the quantification of likelihood for plant 
and equipment failures. The process involves identifying 
potential operator errors and quantifying the probabilities (or 
at least likelihoods) of those errors, and anticipating the 
consequence on the technical system. Potential errors, which 
are context specific, may be identified by task analysis [4] 
based on observation and discussion. Conventional fault 
trees and event trees, which are common in PRA, have a 
limited ability to accommodate operator behaviour [5]. The 
focus in HRA is typically on operator error, rather than 
organisational errors. The former is closely linked to failure 
of a physical system, and easier to quantify. As with PRA, 
HRA does not readily identify the organisational and 
management factors, nor are some cognitive effects such as 
emotional state of the operator typically identified. 
Sometimes performance shaping factors are used to link 
operator errors to other factors such as management and site-
specific conditions, but may be difficult to justify or 
implement robustly. Identifying human errors is therefore 
not straight-forward in the HRA process. 
 Human operators make errors when their behaviour 
deviates from the intended. Typical consequences of human 
error are physical injury, damage to plant and equipment, 
and poor workmanship (for the manufacturing setting). 
Human errors have been classified [5, 6] into:  
• slips (operator performed an action she did not 
intend), 
• lapses (operator forgot information or to perform an 
action that was intended), 
• mistakes (operator decided what action to take, and 
performed it, but it was an inappropriate choice in the 
first place), including perseveration/fixation 
(persistent acceptance of a false belief), and 
• violations (operator knew what procedure to follow, 
but did not). 
 The broader organisational setting is represented in 
Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ model of error causation. This 
assumes multiple barriers to error must fail (the holes in 
slices of cheese must line up) for failure to occur. The errors 
include those listed above, and the barriers may include 
organisational, supervision, preconditions and operator 
actions. This is the dominant paradigm for thinking about 
human error, and provides a good motivation for having 
multiple layers of defence against error. However it 
promotes the idea of independence between the barriers, and 
it therefore fails to provide insight into the interactions 
between barrier systems. The Swiss Cheese model is overly 
simplistic and may even be a defective construct when it 
comes to complex interactions within socio-technological 
systems. 
 The other important paradigm in human error is 
Rasmussens’s distinction between ‘automated skill-based 
behaviour, rule-based “know-how” and knowledge-based 
analysis’ [7], i.e. that there are several cognitive paths by 
which decision making may occur, and different types of 
errors occur in each of them [8, 9]. 
2.3. Human-Error in Aircraft 
 Human-error is a factor in nearly 70% - 80% of all civil 
aviation accidents and has been so since improvements to 
aircraft safety plateaued in the 1970’s [10-12]. Much work 
has been done to determine factors which influence the 
occurrence of human errors leading to aviation accidents. 
 Pilot gender was implicated as a major contributing 
factor to pilot error rates however investigations found that 
this early trend was attributed to the recent rise in female 
pilot numbers and the disparity in average pilot age and 
experience between female and male pilots and there was 
otherwise no significant difference in pilot-error rates [13, 
14]. On the other hand pilot age and experience were found 
to have a significant impact on the ratio of human error 
based accidents to total accidents with a decreasing trend 
with increasing experience [14]. Cultural differences have 
also been implicated as a possible source of pilot-error, 
particularly in cultures where a large power distance is 
prevalent in the cabin setting [15, 16]. Data mining of 30,243 
accident and incident aviation reports between 1995 – 2008 
provided by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NSTB) determined that a situational outcome was more 
likely to be a crash than an incident when pilot error was 
combined with multiple other contributing factors [17]. For 
situations where pilot-error was combined with only one 
other contributing factor, the ratio of crash outcomes to 
incidents was highest when the second factor was weather 
[17]. 
 Helmreich's 'Crew Resource Management' paradigm 
identifies the main human error contributions as failures of 
communication, decision making, and leadership [18, 19]. 
This has lead to numerous training programmes within the 
airlines. The emphasis is on building awareness of the group 
dynamics and of the crew as a whole, as opposed to captain-
centric behaviour. The purpose is to result in effective 
coordination of actions, especially the avoidance and 
detection of errors in unusual situations. It includes 
organisational and national culture [16, 20]. The paradigm is 
primarily focussed on the human-human interactions. It 
addresses what could be called the protagonist vs multiple-
antagonists situation. It only weakly, if at all, addresses the 
wider interactions between the protagonist vs multiple-
antagonists vs technical-system. 
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 A common idea in the aviation research and practitioner 
literature is that lack of ‘situational awareness’ contributes to 
human error. However this term has many possible 
meanings, and is seldom defined when it is used. The term is 
sufficiently broad and applied so variably, as to make it an 
unreliable concept: in any one application the choice of what 
to include in ‘situational awareness’ is invariably entirely ad-
hoc. We recommend application of a systems engineering 
perspective instead, which would define situational 
awareness as perception of and response to the environment 
external to the protagonist. In that case it is understandable 
that it may include any of the following: detection of objects 
in the visual field, development of a mental model (or mental 
picture) for the dynamics of how the external system is 
behaving, working memory, reassessment of the external 
situation, openness to reassessment of mental models, 
projections of how the system is expected to evolve over 
time (anticipating system behaviour), keeping track of how 
the system has evolved, effective communication 
interactions with others, sharing of knowledge and 
development of a robust collective understanding of how the 
system is behaving, collective decision-making, awareness 
of the actions taken by other agents and coordination of such 
actions between team members, and leadership of the team. 
The above is a systems engineering reinterpretation of 
situational awareness, and is not how the literature usually 
portrays it. 
2.3.1. Classification Systems 
 One of the most commonly employed methods for 
analysing multiple aircraft accidents is the 'Human Error 
Analysis and Classification System' (HFACS) which 
incorporates the human error work of Reason into different 
levels from the organisational down to the pilot [6, 21]. This 
method has had particularly large use in the analysis of 
accidents, e.g. in China, revealing a need for safety 
improvements at the organisational and supervisory level to 
equip pilots with the resources and ability to perform their 
task in a safer manner [10, 22, 23]. The HFACS method 
provides a good global view of focus areas for the reduction 
of human error but it does not provide much insight into the 
errors within the process and their interactions. 
2.3.2. Network Modelling Approaches 
 Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) are often used to 
develop models which quantify the probabilities of accident 
outcomes [24-27]. A recently developed 'Causal Model for 
Air Transport Safety' (CATS) integrates BBNs with event 
sequence diagrams and fault trees in a complex linear model 
[25]. This model is particularly complex and has a reliance 
on the values of the probability assigned to each outcome. 
The selection of these probability values is a point of interest 
as aviation safety is high in comparison to other 
transportation areas and accident occurrences are low, 
leading to a scarcity of data [25, 28]. Models which employ 
BBNs are therefore limited by the quality of the available 
data and the expertise of their experts [28]. 
 Network based methods allow for the analysis of aviation 
accidents in a non-linear fashion which can provide a better 
understanding of the interactions of different influences. The 
Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST) 
methodology is one such network-based method which 
focuses on three major event areas: task, social and 
information, and the interaction of the three [29]. This model 
highlights the importance of pilot situational awareness, a 
factor known to contribute to accidents and an area for 
improvement in piloting system design [11, 29, 30]. Error 
detection strategies [31] and error management training are 
also proposed means to reduce pilot error by improving 
situational awareness and attitudinal and team factors [32]. 
The hardware design of the flight deck controls and 
instruments has been criticised as being overly oriented 
towards optimising physical ergonomics, and neglecting the 
cognitive ergonomics [33]. Thus design-induced errors [34] 
are another compounding factor contributing to situational 
awareness. 
2.3.3. Cognitive Processes and Sociotechnical Interactions 
 Workload and cognitive loading is a known effect in 
human error generally, and flight and air traffic control are 
no exception [35-37]. Workload has also been modelled with 
BBNs [38]. There is also evidence that the usually assumed 
causality can be inverted: errors have been found to 
contribute to further workload in the flight situation [39]. 
 Clearly human error has a cognitive basis. This was 
recognised early in the development of the field [4, 6, 8, 9, 
40, 41]. However the attribution, which is commonly made 
in the aviation industry, into slips, lapses, and mistakes, 
tends to obscure the deeper cognitive mechanisms. Attempts 
to better understand those have focussed on the cognition 
involved in the individual agent (though the term agent is 
more common in the psychology perspectives than in the 
engineering safety literature), and the breakdown of that 
cognition and memory [42]. Since much thought occurs in 
subconscious ways that are not explicit to the agent, this is a 
challenging area and understanding of the causality is 
limited. In these more complex situations, agents necessarily 
apply dynamic cognitive strategies for problem-solving [36, 
43]. There is also the issue of shared (or distributed) 
cognition in teams [44], for which further factors 
(communication, coordination, cooperation, trust, cohesion) 
contribute to breakdown [45]. Interactions between agents 
will not necessarily conform to rules and prescription [46], 
and even cross-checking, which is a team interaction, is not 
infallible. Complex interactions occur between teams which 
in the flight setting are known to be affected by delegated 
roles (e.g. captain vs flight officer) [47, 48]. 
 A current area highlighted for further research and 
improvement is the area of sociotechnical interactions. The 
study of sociotechnical interactions considers human agents, 
electronic control systems, and physical artefactual hardware 
as components in a complex dynamically interacting system. 
System failure can occur due to the interactions, even if all 
the components on their own are functional. As there is 
degree of autonomy in most aircraft, the pilot’s ability to 
interact effectively with the system without losing too much 
control or situational awareness is extremely important so 
that in an emergency event the pilot is still able to effectively 
take manual control of the aircraft [11, 15, 49] or transition 
from one level of control (autopilot) to another (manual) 
[37], with incomplete information [46], or mode confusion 
[50] (dissonance between the mental model of the operator 
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and the actual state of the technical system). The 
sociotechnical interactions on the flight desk are still not 
fully understood, particularly with respect to how they are 
affected by cultural influences [15], the representations of 
the hardware state to the pilot [46], and how the pilot builds 
mental awareness of the environment [51]. 
2.3.4. Gaps in the Literature 
 As the above literature shows, there is a need to better 
understand the causes of human-error in the context of the 
situational variables at the time. It is not sufficient to 
consider human-error as an independent random variable. 
Complex situations [52] are not readily solved by standard 
approaches, and in this regard the general safety engineering 
approaches may be too deterministic and simplistic in their 
assumed failure sequences. Traditional approaches based on 
defined failure probabilities, simplistic models of causation, 
linear sequences of events (Swiss cheese models), and 
treatments dependent on rules & procedures, are insufficient 
for complex sociotechnical systems [43]. There is a need for 
methods that examine the system as a whole, rather than 
piecemeal treatment of the structural components [53]. It is 
entirely possible that partitioning failure into ‘human’ error, 
among other types, is entirely the wrong approach [40]. 
Perhaps we should instead be looking at how to model 
unintended system end-states. This is an opportunity for 
system-oriented approaches that treat the functional 
behaviour of the sociotechnical system as an integrated 
whole [53], though the difficulty has been finding a suitable 
representation. 
3. PURPOSE AND METHOD 
 The purpose of this paper was to explore the intersection 
of human-error and production-process, from the systems 
engineering perspective. By production-process we refer to 
the set of actions necessary to move a system from one state 
to a desired new state. In this systems engineering 
perspective, a process is a set of mechanisms for taking 
inputs and converting them to the desired outputs, under 
certain controls and constraints. Landing an aircraft, which is 
the specific case under examination, is just such a process, 
though it is uncommon to see it this way. It involves taking 
an input system, an aircraft at certain altitude & speed etc., 
and through a specific set of procedures and mechanics, 
convert it to a static intact aircraft on the apron and with its 
passengers safely off the craft. Once reframed like this, it 
becomes more apparent that it can be represented as a 
production engineering perspective, and human-error then 
explored in that way. 
 The overall production process of getting passengers 
from airport A to airport B may be broken into many phases, 
including maintenance, preparation of the aircraft, initial 
taxiing, take-off, level flight, manoeuvres, landing, terminal 
taxiing, etc. Some of these activities, such as maintenance, 
are not value-adding in a production sense, i.e. the passenger 
is not progressing from A to B, but can still provide 
opportunity for error incursion with later accident 
consequences. These errors are comparable to what in the 
production situation would be called defects, hence concepts 
of quality and minimisation of waste (lean manufacturing). 
Modelling the whole operation as production process, and 
including all the errors, is beyond the present scope. Instead 
we had a more modest objective, which was to check 
whether the production-lens could be usefully applied to 
error in the aircraft situation. Consequently the analysis was 
limited to one phase only. This was to limit the complexity 
of interactions between multiple phases, and because the 
types of error are known to be different in the various 
phases. We were particularly interested in the dynamic 
interaction between operators and the technology, i.e. 
sociotechnical interaction, and thus selected one of the flight 
phases, as opposed to say maintenance where the issues are 
different. We selected landing as opposed to take-off, level 
flight, or other manoeuvres, as there tend to be more 
accidents in this phase, hence more data are available. 
 The method consists of three main activities. The first 
was to construct a system model of the landing process using 
a production-engineering method. The second was to create a 
classification scheme for human-error in the landing context. 
The third was to examine an on-line repository of aircraft 
crash reports, from which were extracted case-study data. 
These three activities were conducted in parallel, and 
informed each other in an iterative manner. 
3.1. Method for System-Modelling 
 The modelling method is an application of systems 
engineering, specifically a deductive-inductive process. We 
developed this as a general method, and have successfully 
applied it to other situations [54, 55]. We describe it as 
follows:  
'It uses a structured, deductive process to 
decompose the process being analysed into 
multiple sub-activities (functions) and for each 
deduce the initiating events, the controls that 
determine the extent of the outputs, the inputs 
required, the process mechanisms that were 
presumed to support the action, and the outputs. 
The model was then inductively reconciled with 
elements of the existing body of knowledge on this 
topic, and successively refined. The end result is a 
graphical model that describes the relationships 
between variables, thereby providing a synthesis of 
what is known and surmised about the topic. The 
model is expressed as a series of flowcharts using 
the integration definition zero (IDEF0) notation 
[56, 57]. With IDEF0 the object types are inputs, 
controls, outputs, and mechanisms (ICOM) and are 
distinguished by placement relative to the box, with 
inputs always entering on the left, controls above, 
outputs on the right, and mechanisms below. The 
box itself describes a function (or activity), and the 
arc (line arrow) describes an object. The arrows 
represent the conveyance of objects to activities 
and not sequence of activities. Consequently an 
activity may begin autonomously when its required 
inputs are available and its constraints permit. 
Importantly, multiple activity boxes can therefore 
be simultaneously active (concurrent/parallel), and 
sequenced activities (series) can also be readily 
modelled' [54, 55]. 
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3.2. Case Studies 
 The Aviation Herald was used to extract case-study data. 
The case studies were selected based on outcome severity, so 
that only crashes (accidents with the potential to cause 
fatalities of all on board) were analysed. The case studies are 
listed in Table 1. 
 For each case study we processed the reports and 
categorised the errors according to when in the process they 
occurred. The classification system is shown in the results 
below, and includes engineering failures, human-error, and 
weather conditions. Our interest was primarily in the human-
error conditions, and thus this section has more detail than 
the others. A total of fifteen cases were processed in this 
way. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. System Model of the Landing Process 
 The resulting flowchart representation of the landing 
process modelled using the IDEF0 notation is shown in Fig. 
(1). The flowchart shows the deconstruction of the landing 
process into the major activities which take place, inclusive 
of some uncommon yet possible activities such as land and 
hold short operations (LAHSO). Because of this not all 
activities are completed during a single successful landing 
approach. The model also has some recursive elements 
where the landing approach can be carried out more than 
once following a go-around or similar. Each action has an 
accompanying code and each action input a descriptor. The 
figure gives the flowchart from which a safe landing process 
culminating in the safe arrival of the aircraft at the terminal, 
can be derived. The crash activity is also included in the 
diagram. A high number of inputs can lead to a crash 
outcome as it is possible for a crash to occur during any 
stage of the landing approach. Not all of these are shown in 
Fig. (1) for this system model so that the model can preserve 
as much simplicity as possible. 
4.2. Classification Scheme for Landing Errors 
 The factors influential to a landing approach were 
divided into three main classes – human factors, technical 
failures and weather stimulus. A fourth category was used to 
classify the severity of the crash outcome. The classification 
system was developed in conjunction with the analysis of the 
cases studies and improved and refined iteratively. We 
developed this classification system by subjectively extract-
ing factors from the crash data, as opposed to automatically 
following the slip/lapse/mistake/violation paradigm, since 
our priority was to build a model that was coherent with the 
data rather than with conventional constructs. Nonetheless 
there are recognisable commonalities that emerge. 
 The classification scheme is based on the explicit 
behavioural events evident in the failure reports. We take an 
evidence-based approach, and avoid inferring anything that 
is not present in the reports. Consequently the classification 
scheme is more likely to be a fault tree, and other implicit 
behavioural-shaping factors are not represented here. Nor 
there is any attempt to interpret the data according to some 
preferred theory of error causality. This does mean that the 
scheme only captures the surface actions, as opposed to the 
reasons beneath those. We are comfortable with this 
approach because the various protagonists in the flight 
situation respond to each other's explicit behaviours 
(including lack thereof), and the tacit behavioural-shaping 
factors are hidden from each other. 
 All human factors are described from the point of view of 
the person who is pilot-flying, the person of interest in the 
analysis undertaken. As the human factors were the focus of 
Table 1. Case studies used in the analysis. 
 
Case Number Airline Reference Source 
1 RusAir Rusair T134 at Petrozavodsk on Jun 20th 2011 [58] 
2 Henan Airlines Henan Airlines E190 at Yichun on Aug 24th 2010 [59] 
3 Georgia Airways Georgian Airways CRJ1 at Kinshasa on Apr 4th 2011 [60] 
4 Polish Air Force Polish Air Force T154 at Smolensk on Apr 10th 2010 [61] 
5 Hewa Bora Hewa Bora B721 at Kisangani on Jul 8th 2011 [62] 
6 Fedex MD11 Fedex MD11 at Tokyo on Mar 23rd 2009 [63] 
7 Afriqiyah A332 Afriqiyah A332 at Tripoli on May 12th 2010 [64] 
8 Air India Express Air India Express B738 at Mangalore on May 22nd 2010 [65] 
9 Agni Air Agni D228 at Jomsom on May 14th 2012 [66] 
10 Merapati MA60 Merpati MA60 at Kaimana on May 7th 2011 [67] 
11 AirBlue AirBlue A321 near Islamabad on Jul 28th 2010 [68] 
12 Katekavia Katekavia AN24 at Igarka on Aug 3rd 2010 [69] 
13 Conviasa Conviasa AT42 near Puerto Ordaz on Sep 13th 2010 [70] 
14 Colgan DH8D Colgan DH8D at Buffalo on Feb 12th 2009 [71] 
15 Aviastar Mandiri Aviastar Mandiri B463 at Wamena on Apr 9th 2009 [72] 
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this model the human factor category was split into four 
subcategories: pilot flying actions, procedural failure, 
decision failure/misjudgement, and team dynamic 
influences. The first subcategory, pilot flying inability, 
describes influences which are inherent in the pilot’s ability 
to fly at the time of the accident and can most often be 
considered as the responsibility of the airline who have a 
duty to ensure its pilots are competent. The second 
subcategory, procedural failure, is a failure by the pilot to 
correctly follow a well-defined or semi-automatic process. 
Subcategory three, decision failure/misjudgement, describes 
failures of the individual to interpret sometimes ambiguous 
or conflicting data to provide a necessary response. The final 
subcategory, team dynamic influence, defines external 
influences from other team members which add increased 
complexity to the pilot’s tasks. 
 Table 2 provides descriptions and codes for the 
categories and subcategories used for influence 
classification. Quantities are given in the right hand column 
of the table denoting the number of cases out of the fifteen 
studied in which each influence type was a prevalent factor. 
Influences of each type, particularly human factors, may 
have occurred multiple times during a single landing process 
but for the purpose of this overview they are only counted 
once per case study. 
 
 No special claim is made for this classification scheme. It 
is simply an evidence-based summary of the agency apparent 
in the accident reports. A more comprehensive scheme could 
be developed, underpinned by an error theory of choice. 
However that is left for future work, since our present 
purpose is to explore the feasibility of the production 
perspective, for which this simple scheme is a sufficient 
starting point. 
4.3. Case Studies 
 The case-studies were evaluated and the error codes 
extracted. These incidences are shown in Table 2 above. 
They are also mapped onto the process diagram at the 
activity level as opposed to the case level, as shown in the 
figures below (Fig. 2). 
 Fig. (2) highlights the landing process taken by the flight 
of the first case study with the error codes experienced at 
each activity stage mapped onto the flowchart. Activities not 
undertaken during the landing process are rendered in light 
grey as opposed to blue to distinguish them. In the top right 
corner error codes for environmental influences, those 
influences which affect the entire landing process, are listed. 
 Fig. (3) gives the flowchart with all fifteen cases studies 
mapped onto it. The thickness of the arrows lines are used to  
 
 
 
Fig. (1). System model of a safe landing process, and the crash outcome, represented in IDEF0 notation. 
Aviation Human Error Modelled as a Production Process The Ergonomics Open Journal, 2015, Volume 8    7 
Table 2. Classification table and incidences from case studies. 
 
H: Human Factors QTY 
H1 Pilot Flying Inability  
H1.1 Lethargy 2 
H1.2 Inadequate Training 4 
H2 Procedural Failure  
H2.1 Checkpoint not Acknowledged 2 
H2.2 Improper Planning or Preparation 6 
H2.3 Incorrect Procedure Employed 5 
H2.4 Bad Approach Profile 6 
H3 Decision Failure/Misjudgement/Disregard  
H3.1 Advice Disregarded 5 
H3.2 Warning Signal Disregarded 8 
H3.3 Improper Action Taken to Improve Approach Profile 5 
H3.4 Decision Delay or Insufficient Action 5 
H4 Team Dynamic Influence  
H4.1 Bad Team Dynamics or Communication 5 
H4.2 False Information or Information Withheld 2 
H4.3 Team Disruption or Confusion 3 
H4.4 Conflict of Interests 1 
H5 Cognitive effects  
H5.1 Excessive workload  
H5.2 Incongruence and Conflicting task demands  
T: Technical Failures  
T1 Propulsion Failure 1 
T2 Instrument Failure 2 
T3 Landing Gear Failure 1 
T4 Navigation System Failure 1 
T5 Approach Lighting Failure 1 
W: Weather Stimulus  
W1 Wind Shear 2 
W2 Lightening Strike 0 
W3 Fog/Low Visibility 8 
W4 High Winds 0 
W5 Heavy Rain 2 
W6 Icing Conditions 1 
X: Outcome Severity  
X1 Minimal Damage to Aircraft 0 
X2 Significant Damage to Aircraft 0 
X3 Some Fatalities 8 
X4 Full Fatalities 7 
 
represent the number of cases which arrive at each action 
from the previous action. The number of cases which carry 
out each action is also denoted by the number shown in 
parentheses in the lower right corner of each action box. 
Actions which were not undertaken by any of the fifteen case 
studies are rendered in grey as before. For this aggregate 
flowchart, each error code has an associated occurrence 
number following it in parentheses. This occurrence number 
describes the number of cases, out of the fifteen cases 
studied, which had at least one influence of the error code 
type at that particular process action. When cases are 
considered individually there are often multiple errors of the 
same occurring at the same process action, however to note 
multiple errors of the same type on an aggregate flowchart 
would be misleading and it is more valuable to represent the 
cases in this way in order to derive more interesting 
conclusions. 
 The present dataset (15 cases) is intended only to validate 
the methodology, and does not have great statistical power. 
Nonetheless it is possible to extract some observations and 
insights. 
4.4. Integration and Interpretation 
 Taking the process perspective is useful as it teases out 
where the human-error occurs in the process. The results 
show that landing crashes are primarily associated with poor-
visibility WEATHER as the overall situational variable. The 
failure sequence itself originates primarily, and relatively 
consistently, in the process of INITIAL LANDING 
APPROACH (as opposed to later). The main contributors to 
failure are human error, specifically types H2 procedural 
failure and H3 decision failure/misjudgement. 
 First, this model shows that the H2 human procedural 
errors are prevalent throughout the process, but are the 
dominant error-stream at processes 4.1 to 4.4. In other 
words, the antecedents for accidents are occurring when 
pilots are initially engaging with the landing sequence of 
processes, which is well before the actual landing approach. 
Thus, at least in these cases, it is the initial decision-making 
which makes up the dominant type of human error. In 
particular, these pilots are not following established good 
practices, not initially nor later. 
 Obviously pilots do not willingly fly to their doom, and 
are generally well-trained in the procedures. So why are they 
ignoring the initial landing processes? We cannot answer 
that from within this study, but we can ask the questions: Are 
they over-confident and blasé? Or stressed and distracted? 
Cognitively over-burdened? Inexperienced or Inadequately 
trained? 
 Second, the model shows that H3 human decision errors 
are crowded at the 4.5 process (initial landing approach). 
(The H2 procedural errors are also continuing at this stage). 
These H3 errors are of the 'disregard' type. They are 
disregarding warning information and not deviating from 
their disastrous course of action. They display a persistence 
with a poor decision: having made the initial poor decision 
these pilots pass over subsequent opportunities to change 
their decision to a better one. For example, they are not using 
the go-round loop as much as they might, nor diverting to 
other airports. It would seem that these pilots are not open to 
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de-biasing themselves. It would appear they are disregarding 
disconfirmatory information that is not consistent with their 
mental model and its associated decisions, i.e. a confirmation 
bias. Is this a problem with a limited mental model of the 
aircraft-in-the-situation? Are they feeling subconscious 
pressure to land the aircraft immediately, and if so why? 
 It is also notable that the decisions that lead to accidents 
are being made under conditions of low visibility (W3 
weather condition). This suggests there could be an 
interaction between decision-making and the external visual-
field. What is it about low visibility, as opposed to other 
weather conditions, that uniquely makes pilots take chances, 
dispense with procedures, and persist with poor decisions? 
 Putting all this together, a tentative overall 
recommendation emerges: that better de-biasing processes 
may be needed in the cockpit, specifically at or immediately 
before initial landing approach (4.5), and especially under 
conditions of low visibility. Pilots need to recognise the 
process-stages and situations where it is wise to question 
their own decisions. 
 We therefore suggest it is useful to consider the phasing 
of human error relative to the process stages. As this model 
shows, there are different types of errors at different stages. 
Consequently the implication is that programmes to reduce 
error rates would be more effective were they to focus on the 
particular errors at particular stages, rather than simply treat 
human error as a lumped parameter. 
5. DISCUSSION 
5.1. What has been Achieved? 
 This paper makes several novel contributions. The first is 
the methodological contribution of demonstrating that a 
production-process approach can be used to define a system 
model of the landing process, in which human error can 
readily be included. This process-based style allows the 
analyst to determine when in the landing process the errors 
occur. Thus this methodology makes the progression (or 
time) dimension explicit in the human-error analysis, and 
thereby readily provides for the inclusion of time-dependent 
situational variables. Several novel propositions emerge 
from this line of thinking. 
 A second contribution is the provision of descriptive 
physical models for the analysis of aviation accidents during 
the landing process. Specific subcomponents to this model 
are a classification system for human errors in this context. 
Our analysis of the data suggest that in this situation there 
are four subcategories of human error: pilot flying inability, 
procedural failure, decision failure/misjudgement, and team-
dynamic influences. We did not set out to prove or disprove 
the conventional construct of slip/lapse/mistake/violation, 
but nonetheless our results find against it. In hindsight it is 
apparent that Reason’s model is focussed, we would say too 
strongly, around the premise of an individual human agent. 
In contrast we suggest that the interaction of multiple human 
 
Fig. (2). Examination of a single case study (RusAir) showing the errors mapped onto the process diagram. 
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agents (team-dynamics) and the interaction with the complex 
technical system (evident in decision failure) are as 
important as isolated consideration of the individual. It is the 
application of the production perspective that makes this 
contrast clearer: looking at the production processes that lead 
to these crashes, one cannot but see the importance of these 
other factors. 
 We have also provided a production model for the 
landing process. In addition we have shown that it is 
straightforward to use this to both aggregate the results from 
case studies, and extract single cases for scrutiny. The 
method offers a form of qualitative longitudinal analysis. 
 A third contribution is the determination, based on data, 
of the critical processes. This analysis method was 
particularly useful in determining the importance of the 
initial landing approach to the decision height at which the 
landing must either continue or be aborted. It is during this 
process that a large number of human error factors occur and 
following this process that subsequent actions tend to 
diverge. It is also at this process that technical failures may 
occur and the pilots’ management of these during this critical 
phase of the landing process is therefore of high importance. 
5.2. The Production Lens 
 Fundamental to this model is the thinking that human 
error is something to be expected, and therefore actively de-
biased against. Existing approaches to human error tend to 
give it a pejorative meaning, treating it as an unnatural, bad, 
or negligent behaviour that must be stamped out. We are not 
convinced that is the best way treat it. Specifically, we are 
concerned that framing human error as negligence 
immediately sets it up in conflict with the conscientiousness 
and need for achievement motivation that operators (pilots in 
this case) may naturally bring to their work, and thereby 
subconsciously invites operators to deny the possible agency 
of the effect in their own behaviour. We do not dismiss the 
severity of the consequences of human error in aviation, but 
we do feel that it is better to bring human error into the open, 
to mainstream it with the other processes that are happening 
at the time, and treat as any other production problem. To the 
way of thinking that we suggest, human error is one of many 
production factors the variability of which affects the quality 
of the outcomes. From a production perspective it may not 
be possible to eliminate these variables, but it should at least 
be possible to reduce their effect. Furthermore, the 
production perspective strongly suggests that the way to 
improve processes that are out of control is not by simply 
adding more output control, but rather involves working with 
the operators to understand where and why the variability 
occurs, and then find ways to reduce it. 
 The results show, in the specific cases under 
examination, that the persistence of initial mistakes can 
occur even in situations where operators are specifically 
trained, individually and as a group, to be alert to such 
behaviours. It suggests that training, knowledge, and team 
 
Fig. (3). Aggregation of multiple case-studies with error codes by subcategory. 
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cross-checks are in themselves insufficient to break the 
failure causality in all cases. Many of the cases could have 
ended better if the protagonists had questioned their own 
comprehension. Early in the processes they adopted what 
were to be unsuitable mental models of how the craft was 
performing, e.g. how it was physically interacting with the 
external environment and how its control systems were 
interfacing to the pilots. It is apparent that complexity and 
remoteness of the technology contribute to the difficulty of 
diagnosing malfunction and comprehending the appropriate 
course of action, even for well-trained flight-crews working 
constructively. As the case of flight AF 447 craft F-GZCP 
(2009) showed, the flight-crew were unable to comprehend 
what was happening with the craft once the automated 
systems disconnected [73]. It is not certain that the 
development of more knowledge, through more training, will 
help this type of situation. The issue is cognitive processes, 
rather than knowledge per se. In all the examples studied 
here, the flight-crews did not appear to question the 
sufficiency of their cognitive constructs, and thus were 
unable to make a transition to a better understanding of how 
the system was behaving and where their personal agency 
should be applied. The need is therefore for a deeper 
mechanism to de-bias the cognition, especially the diagnostic 
and agency frameworks at the level of individual 
protagonists. That is not a novel finding as it is consistent 
with the literature, but it is support for the method. 
5.3. Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research 
 We have already identified the limitation of the 
classification scheme (its focus on explicit surface 
behaviours rather than underpinning cognitive factors), and 
the poor statistical power of the limited case-base. There are 
additional limitations which are briefly identified below. 
 As this method for analysis requires such a deep analysis 
of each case in order to gain useful information it is therefore 
limited to cases for which such information is available. In 
our specific case we only had access to information that is 
publically available, and of the many cases reviewed only a 
relatively small proportion (those shown) had the necessary 
quality of data for inclusion. Nor were the full flight records 
and cockpit transcripts available for this analysis, so it was 
not possible to infer whether there may have been 
misinterpretation, information overload, workload, or other 
team behaviours, unless these were included in the accident 
report. 
 If more data could be gained by applying this analysis 
tool to further case studies, statistical analysis of the 
influences and process stages at which they occur could be 
carried out. By statistically analysing this data, further trends 
and relationships may be exposed which could in turn 
highlight areas for improvement within the aviation sector. 
Civil aviation agencies have the type of data required for this 
methodology and could be encouraged to apply the 
longitudinal type of analysis that the process perspective 
enables. 
 Also, our work was limited to the landing phase, and 
even then to crashes. There are many other situations that 
could be explored with this methodology, including other 
phases in the airtravel process, and less negative outcomes. 
For example, is it possible to characterise best-practice 
outcomes in a similar way? 
 Another limitation, this time a deliberate one, is that the 
study does not attempt to attribute deeper causality to the 
actions of the protagonists. The reason for avoiding any 
deeper attribution of causality is that the risk was too high of 
having the work captured by one or other of the prevailing 
paradigms of human error, i.e. an attribution bias. Instead we 
wanted to see whether the production perspective could, 
starting from a clean slate, have anything meaningful and 
insightful to say about human error. The results shows that 
this is indeed the case. Nonetheless the development of a 
deeper theory of human error, complementary to the present 
more empirical outcome, is desirable as a future endeavour. 
CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this work was to investigate human error 
in aviation as a part of landing process. We have developed a 
novel process methodology for considering how technical 
systems, situational variables, external factors, and human 
error all evolve over time in a process. We have 
demonstrated the applicability of the method by application 
to a small dataset. 
 Taking the production perspective permits a novel 
process-methodology to be developed, in which human error 
is treated as a constraint on the processes. In parallel, a new 
categorisation of human errors is derived for the situation 
under examination, this being aircraft landing. The result in a 
process model of the landing activities, represented in IDEF0 
flowchart notation, and explicitly identifying what human 
errors occur where. The analysis is therefore down to the 
level of individual processes, as opposed to looking at 
landing as a single event. The method was applied to several 
case studies of real accidents. These could be examined 
individually, or more interestingly, examined collectively for 
patterns. The results show that the initial landing approach is 
critical and often the point of error initiation. 
 If the model is correct, then the implications are that the 
initial landing approach is critical and that pilots should be 
trained to be able to manage influences, distractions, 
complications, and errors at this stage of flight in particular. 
The failure causality, for the accidents examined, was the 
lack of attention to establish procedure at the very start of 
descent, followed by persistent disregard of disconfirmatory 
evidence at the initial landing approach, under conditions of 
poor visibility. 
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